Problem of Other Minds - Introduction

Can you really know what another is thinking or feeling? Indeed, can you even know whether another has mental states at all to begin with? If so, how? This is the philosophical problem of other minds. In this lecture Professor Reynolds considers two main types of response to such a problem: those that are inferential in nature and argue that perception of others alone is an insufficient justification, requiring either an argument by analogy, or an inference to the best explanation; those that are non-inferential in nature, advocating either direct perception of others in some core emotions, or the view that certain experiences that we do have (e.g. shame) presuppose the existence of others. This is from a series on philosophical problems given at La Trobe.

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Philosophy,History of Philosophy,Other Minds,Problem of Other Minds,Solipsism,Epistemology,Descartes,Cartesian,Mind-Body,Subject-Object,Behaviorism,Consciousness,Subjectivity,Sartre,Phenomenology,Existentialism,Direct Realism,Emotion,Perception,Skepticism,Scepticism,Psychology,Philosophy of Mind,Wittgenstein,Being and Nothingness,The Other,Certainty,